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Article
Hurting More than Helping:
How the Marshall Islands’ Seeming Bravery
Against Major Powers Only Stands to Maim the
Legitimacy of the World Court
Katherine Maddox Davis
I.

INTRODUCTION

As Greenpeace and a contingency of world leaders laud the
Marshall Islands’ legal crusade against nuclear weapons states,
the cases themselves appear mostly dead on arrival.1 Of nine ICJ
suits filed against the nuclear weapons states, six never
progressed for lack of jurisdiction.2 Of the remaining three, legal
arguments are attenuated against India and Pakistan as nonparties to the NPT and the proceedings on the merits against the
United Kingdom are presently suspended for deliberation on
preliminary objections.3
The potential ramifications of the Marshall Islands’ legal
indiscretion extend beyond these immediate legal losses. The
legal action may jeopardize the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction
over the only submitting major powers, India and the United



Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. J.D., Emory University School of Law, 2015; M.Sc., University of
Oxford, 2012; B.A., Auburn University, 2010. The author gives warmest thanks
to Professor Johan D. van der Vyver for his expert mentorship.
1. Professor Julian Ku characterized the proceedings as “[m]ostly just
grandstanding by a very small nation with the help of a savvy (but sloppy) US
law firm.” See Julian Ku, Marshall Islands Sues to Enforce Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty; U.K. May Be Dragged into ICJ, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 24,
2014, 2:48 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/24/marshall-islands-suesenforce-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-uk-may-dragged-icj/.
2. See infra Section II(B)(2).
3. In an American federal district court, an additional suit against the
United States was dismissed and is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. See
infra Section II(A).
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Kingdom.4 Among probable outcomes to the Marshall Islands’
suits, the ICJ will be forced to draw attention to its anemic
authority, and major powers may be prompted to withdraw from
compulsory jurisdiction. In a lamentable irony, the Marshall
Islands’ suits stand to do more damage to the ICJ’s legitimacy
than positively impact nuclear disarmament.
This Article contends that submission to compulsory
jurisdiction is the gold standard of the ICJ’s legitimacy. That
submission is what the Marshall Islands now threaten. India is
already taking steps identical to the United States’ first actions
before withdrawing its submission.5 The United Kingdom
altered its agreement of jurisdiction with the ICJ, seemingly to
block this very case, and has already begun to challenge the
proceedings, though the grounds of its challenge are not yet
public.6 The most probable outcome of the Marshall Islands’
action is not that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will
be more strictly enforced, but that the Marshall Islands’
applications will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (conceding
how little authority the ICJ has), or that India and/or the United
Kingdom will follow the example of China, France, and the
United States in revoking submission to the ICJ’s opt-in
provision to compulsory jurisdiction, known as the Optional
Clause.7 Either of the probable outcomes could decrease the
legitimacy of the ICJ, ominously continuing a downward trend
nearly a century in the running.8 The Marshall Islands’ self4. While the same may be true for Pakistan, this Article focuses on India
and the United Kingdom because the major powers’ withdrawals would have a
greater impact on the legitimacy of the ICJ. For purposes of this work, ‘major
powers’ will be defined by economic productivity. According to the World Bank,
the ten largest national economies by GDP in 2014 were the United States,
China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy, Russia, and
India. See World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2014, in WORLD DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS 1 (2015), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
Pakistan’s GDP was ranked forty-third. Id.
5. See infra Section VI.
6. See infra Section II(B)(1). See Obligations Concerning Negotiations
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament
(Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order (June 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/files/160/18710.pdf. ICJ rules maintain that pleadings may not be made public,
if at all, until the oral proceedings stage. Rules of the International Court of
Justice, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6, at art. 53(2) (“The Court may, after
ascertaining the views of the parties, decide that copies of the pleadings and
documents annexed shall be made accessible to the public on or after the
opening of the oral proceedings.”) [hereinafter Rules of Court].
7. See infra Section III.
8. See infra Section III(A).
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lauded efforts may backfire in the face of everything that
proponents of public international law sought to achieve in the
past century.
This Article proceeds with background information on the
NPT, laying ground to assess the legal merits of the Marshall
Islands’ arguments. Section II summarizes the Marshall Islands’
action thus far in U.S. federal court and before the ICJ,
analyzing the strategies for short- and long-term success.
Ironically, Section II finds greater long-term potential in
American courts than before the ICJ. Section III assesses the
waning authority of the ICJ, and Section IV recounts the
manners in which China, France, and the United States
withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.
Taking cues from past circumstances of withdrawal,
Sections V and VI assess the likelihood that the United Kingdom
and India, respectively, will throw off compulsory jurisdiction in
the wake of the Marshall Islands’ legal campaign. Attention is
first given to procedural bars, rooted in Optional Clause
declarations, then to the legal merits in the event that the
procedure is deemed permissible, and finally to the likelihood of
revoking submission to the Optional Clause.
Section V finds that procedure seems on the United
Kingdom’s side, though a yet-tested reservation could be a wild
card, and that if the United Kingdom acts as the United States
did, the state will withdraw its Optional Clause declaration if it
loses on procedure; that the ICJ would be hard pressed to find
against the United Kingdom on the merits; and that overall, the
United Kingdom would have little to lose by withdrawing its
declaration.
Section VI finds more questions than answers in the Indian
case, though none would help the reputation of the ICJ, and any
may lead India to consider withdrawing from the Optional
Clause. The question of jurisdiction in the Indian case is any
state’s game, as India has seen mixed success in recent attempts
to argue lack of ICJ jurisdiction based upon its Optional Clause
reservations.9 The Marshall Islands’ legal arguments against
India fall dismally flat in light of India’s lack of affiliation with
the NPT.10 However, due to India’s ongoing proliferation of
nuclear weapons technology, even a perceived loss of
invincibility before the ICJ may spook India into withdrawing

9. See infra Section VI(A).
10. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, infra note 17.
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from the Optional Clause should the ICJ incorrectly find
jurisdiction. India may be particularly calculated because of its
present campaign for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security
Council, though such a procedural long shot may not be worth
compromising in the present case.11
Even if either case reaches judgment without prompting the
withdrawal of a major power, the likelihood of enforcement is
nearly non-existent;12 thus, legitimacy will be inevitably
siphoned from the ICJ. Ultimately, this Article finds little longterm merit in the Marshall Islands’ strategy, and great potential
loss for the ICJ as the hapless victim of its own idealism.
A. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
As a threshold matter, the murky language of the NPT
handicaps the merits of the Marshall Islands’ arguments. At the
time of the treaty’s negotiation, the five major victors of World
War II maintained operational nuclear weapons.13 The NPT
came into force in 1970 as a major compromise between these
states and non-weapons states.14 Given the ongoing spoils of
victor’s justice, such as permanent U.N. Security Council seats,
other nations were hesitant to allow the five nuclear weapons
states further opportunities to permanently entrench their
power.15 India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) each developed and tested nuclear
weapons after the treaty came into force.16 However, the treaty
restricts the title of “nuclear weapons state” to those countries
that tested weapons prior to January 1, 1967.17 The latecomers’
11. Adding a permanent member to the Security Council would require
amending the United Nations Charter, which would require a majority vote of
all member states. See U.N. Charter art. 108. Such a feat is highly unlikely.
12. See infra Section III(A).
13. See REBECCA JOHNSON, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE NEGOTIATION OF
THE CTBT AND THE END OF NUCLEAR TESTING 2 (U.N. Institute for
Disarmament Research ed., 2009).
14. See Nobuyasu Abe, The Current Problems of the NPT: How to
Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Regime, in THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA 38 (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012).
15. See generally Leonard Weiss, India and the NPT, in THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012) (proposing
that India must end nuclear testing in order to strengthen non-proliferation).
16. See James Conca, The Nuclear Weapons States—Who Has Them and
How Many, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca
/2014/09/25/the-nuclear-weapons-states-who-has-them-and-how-many/.
17. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IX, July 1,
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only options were to join the NPT as non-weapons states—
tainting the legitimacy of their sophisticated status—or to
abstain from joining the treaty. Most chose not to join.18
The three pillars of the NPT are “[n]on-proliferation,
disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.”19
Non-proliferation and disarmament are addressed in NPT
Article VI—the subject of the Marshall Islands’ suits.20 The right
to peaceful use of nuclear energy is addressed in Article IV.
Article VI tentatively calls for an end to the creation of nuclear
weapons and the beginning of a conversation to destroy existing
nuclear weapons, and to pen a new treaty for strict control of
nuclear armaments.21 The language most at issue is the
commitment to “[u]ndertake[] to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date.”22
Today, the Marshall Islands argue that Article VI has been
breached because nuclear weapons still exist.23 The Marshall
Islands opine that the suits are “[n]ot an attempt to re-open the
question of the legality of nuclear weapons,” but to focus on “[t]he
failure to fulfill the obligations of customary international law
with respect to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the
NPT and declared by the Court.”24 As for obligations of custom,
the battle is damned by the sheer non-existence of the customary
international law on which the Marshall Islands rests much of
its case.25 The NPT interpretation is also extreme, as

1968–Mar. 2, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
18. See Abe, supra note 14, at 38.
19. Arvind Gupta, NPT Review Conference 2010: Issues and Prospects, in
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA 42 (Rajiv Nayan ed.,
2012).
20. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17,
at art. VI. See also Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of
India, infra note 23.
21. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17,
at art. VI. (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations
in good faith . . . on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.”).
22. Id.
23. See Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of India,
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Pleadings, 3 (Apr. 24,
2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., infra Section II(B).
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emphasized by attempts of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation—
the organization behind the suits—to name the Marshall
Islands’ legal action “the Nuclear Zero Lawsuits.”26
The fuzzy language of Article VI creates an uphill battle
distinguishing
compliance
from
non-compliance.
The
noncommittal language, “[u]ndertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith,” makes the Marshall Islands’ interpretation
particularly extreme, especially in light of Article IV, which
condones and even encourages the peaceful use of nuclear
energy.27 The NPT drafters demonstrated convictions that
ending nuclear energy entirely was against the interests of
society.28 Even before the provision on ending the arms race,
Article IV clarifies:
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting
the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.29
An “inalienable right” to nuclear research is strong
language, indeed. Because the treaty leaves “nuclear arms race”
undefined in Article VI, any nation wishing to parse the legal
ambiguities of the treaty to fit its needs may conflate conducting
research and taking up arms. Consequently, the NPT language
does not position the Marshall Islands to reasonably expect
success.
II. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS’ LEGAL STRATEGIES
Shortly before the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee
26. See infra Section II(B)(2); NUCLEAR ZERO, www.nuclearzero.org (last
visited Feb. 16, 2016).
27. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17,
at art. IV, VI.
28. Id. at art. IV.
29. Id.
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meetings, the Marshall Islands filed legal action against all nine
nuclear weapons states.30 The Marshall Islands’ actions were
based on assertions that the states are in breach of the NPT’s
Article VI, calling for an end to the nuclear arms race and for
general disarmament.31 As explained infra, these arguments are
particularly attenuated against India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and
Israel; none of which are parties to the NPT.32 While the
proceedings have yet to receive extensive news coverage, likely
because of lengthy ICJ procedures,33 Greenpeace issued a
statement lauding the nation’s efforts.34 A group of eighty-six
figures from around the globe permitted their names to appear
at the bottom of a blog post constituting an ‘open letter’
supporting the Marshall Islands’ legal action.35 That the
30. See Press Release 2014/18, INT’L CT. JUST., The Republic of the
Marshall Islands Files Applications Against Nine States for Their Alleged
Failure to Fulfil Their Obligations with Respect to the Cessation of the Nuclear
Arms Race at an Early Date and to Nuclear Disarmament, (Apr. 25, 2014),
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/0/18300.pdf.
31. See id. at 2–3.
32. See id.
33. All cases were filed in April 2014. In the ICJ proceedings concerning
India, for example, the Marshall Islands were given until December 2014 to
brief the court on jurisdiction, with India’s brief due in September 2015. See
Press Release 2014/22, INT’L CT. JUST., Obligations Concerning Negotiations
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament
(Marsh. Is. v. India) Fixing of Time-Limits for Filing of Pleadings on the
Question of Jurisdiction (June 19, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/files/158/18334.pdf; Press Release 2015/14, INT’L CT. JUST., Obligations
Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India) Extension of the Time-Limit for
the Filing of India’s Counter-Memorial (June 2, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org
/docket/files/158/18682.pdf. While no public announcement has been made, the
author contacted the Marshall Islands’ legal counsel and was privately assured
that the memorial was filed before the December 2014 deadline (e-mail on file
with author). Per ICJ rules, memorials will not be made public until the oral
proceedings stage. See Rules of Court, supra note 6, at art. 53(2). In the case
against the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom’s counter-memorial was due
December 16, 2015. See Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is.
v. U.K.), Order, 5 (June 16, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160
/18342.pdf [hereinafter June 16, 2014 Order]. The United Kingdom filed timely
preliminary objections to the case in June 2015, suspending procedure on the
merits. See Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order, 2
(June 19, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18710.pdf. Final rulings
should not be expected soon.
34. See Press Release, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Greenpeace
Champions the Marshall Islands (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.wagingpeace.
org/greenpeace-champions-marshall-islands/.
35. See Open Letter in Support of the Marshall Islands’ Nuclear Zero
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Marshall Islands could have expected these proceedings to lead
to total disarmament of nuclear weapons is an imaginative
stretch for even the most idealistic among the disarmament
movement.36
Given the Marshall Islands’ willingness to enter domestic
jurisdiction in the United States, and the weakness of the
Marshall Islands’ ICJ suit against India, the Marshall Islands
at least should have attempted an action against India in Indian
court. Indian state and federal courts are historically welcome
forums for customary international law arguments.37 At best,
the Marshall Islands missed an opportunity to show a fuller
commitment to overturning every stone in seeking nuclear
disarmament. At worst, the Marshall Islands missed a chance
for a positive ruling that could have impacted Indian efforts to
negotiate an end to the arms race. While the Marshall Islands
may have missed an opportunity in India, the state took a
fascinating risk in a U.S. court which may provide greater
dividends for other treaty parties for years to come.
A. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS’ SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES
On the same day that the Marshall Islands took legal action
before the ICJ, the nation filed a complaint against the United
States in an American federal district court.38 The complaint
was made on identical grounds to those of the ICJ cases, for
breach of custom and the NPT Article VI.39 The Marshall Islands
requested that the court articulate American obligations under
Article VI, determine whether the United States is in
compliance, and call for remedial measures in the event of
noncompliance.40 The United States quickly filed a motion to

Lawsuits, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUND., http://www.wagingpeace.org/rmiopen-letter/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
36. See generally David Kennedy, The Nuclear Weapons Case, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 462 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999)
(commenting on the European legal academy’s ICJ idealism).
37. See Katherine M. Davis, I, Too, Sing America: Customary International
Law for American State and Federal Courts’ Post-Kiobel Jurisprudence, Guided
by Australian and Indian Experiences, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 119, 158–64
(2014).
38. See Complaint at ¶ 1, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. United States, No.
14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2014).
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 3.
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dismiss the case on an array of grounds, including lack of
standing, justiciability, lack of a private cause of action,
improper venue, and timeliness.41 The parties expanded their
arguments in additional filings, as did a handful of the Marshall
Islands’ supporters in amicus briefs.42
The federal district court was initially scheduled to rule on
the motion to dismiss in January 2015.43 Before doing so, the
court made an atypical display of piqued interest. Two days
early, the court issued a tentative decision granting the United
States’ motion to dismiss.44 In a tentative order, the court
dispensed of any desire to hear oral arguments on the merits,
but expressed a willingness to hear twenty minutes from each
side on five questions it laid out alongside the tentative ruling.45
Soon thereafter, the court granted the United States’ motion to
dismiss.46
The court found that the Marshall Islands lacked standing
because the alleged injury was without redress, and the political
question doctrine rendered the matter nonjusticiable.47 The
court declined to articulate American obligations under the
treaty.48 Additional matters relating to right of action, venue,
41. See Motion to Dismiss at 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v.
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014).
42. See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v.
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014); Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. United States,
No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014); Brief of Tri-Valley CAREs as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Venue in the Northern District of California, Republic of
the Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Brief
of Nuclear Watch New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff and in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v.
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014).
43. See Notice of Tentative Ruling and Questions at 1, Republic of the
Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2015).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1, 2.
46. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 1, Republic of the Marsh. Is.
v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015). See also Judgment,
Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2015).
47. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46, at 5, 7.
48. While making no pronouncement, the court did quote the U.S. Senate
report that accompanied ratification. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 46, at 2. That report articulated the core purpose of the treaty as
slowing—not stopping—the spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting weapon
states from transferring weapons and prohibiting non-weapon states from
obtaining nuclear weapons. Id. If this dicta were construed as a full articulation
of American NPT obligations, the Marshall Islands’ current arguments would
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and timeliness were not reached.49 To be fair, the Marshall
Islands had a decent shot at surviving the motion to dismiss,
given the lack of jurisdiction-specific precedent on the matter.50
Counsel for the Marshall Islands filed a notice of appeal in April
2015.51
While prospects seem dashed for the Marshall Islands in the
immediate case, the action charted a potentially powerful path
for other states with stronger treaty breach claims to seek relief
in American court. The prospect of treaty parties choosing to
seek a federal district court’s interpretation of treaty obligations
and assessing whether those obligations are presently met is a
powerful prospect. This strategy is not new, but has been out of
vogue for the better part of two centuries. The parties simply
need to bring action concerning treaties of which the United
States is actually in breach, and make a clearer argument for
overcoming the political question doctrine.52
American treaty breaches are hardly difficult to come by.53
A variety of U.S. district courts interpreting American treaty
obligations could highlight the best of American federalism.54 As
major powers grow increasingly reticent to bring their concerns
to the International Court of Justice, and the success rate of
enforcement among major powers remains abysmal, domestic
courts may see an increase in the volume of international treaty
be negated.
49. E.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46.
50. The lack of jurisdiction-specific precedent was evident by both parties’
reliance on decisions from other federal district courts. See Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 41; Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 42; Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 42. The standing
section of the court’s dismissal order cited only two U.S. Supreme Court cases,
five Ninth Circuit cases, and five cases from other federal jurisdictions. See
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46, at 3–5.
51. See Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal at 1–2, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v.
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015).
52. Complaint at 4, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, No.
14-CV-01885 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2014). While some may be quick to cite
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) as a bar to this litigation, that case
was specific to presidential authority to withdraw from a treaty and does not
address simply articulating American treaty obligations. If federal courts
cannot pronounce American obligations under legal instruments, the political
question doctrine will have regrettably built an end-run to perpetuate American
exceptionalism in international law. See Katherine Maddox Davis, Promise
Despite Overreach in Marshall Islands v. United States, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
53. JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 93 (Peter Lang ed., 2010).
54. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 164 (2009).
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issues on their dockets.55 The trend would mesh with the
growing role of domestic courts in engaging international
matters like arbitral enforcement.56 In sum, despite the anemic
merits of the present case, the Marshall Islands may have
invited a future for American accountability to treaty
obligations. Once all is said and done before the ICJ, dwelling on
that glimmer of hope for future American lawsuits may be the
only way to charitably view the Marshall Islands’ legal
campaign.
One modern champion of introducing international law into
American courts is Justice Stephen Breyer, whose judicial
philosophies on international law are explored in his Medellin v.
Texas dissent and echoed in his more recent Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum concurrence, and his majority opinion in BG
Group, plc v. Republic of Argentina.57 Justice Breyer’s slow climb
from a dissent, to a concurrence, to a majority opinion in cases
inviting international legal interpretation and enforcement may
indicate a broader thread of his influence bringing international
law into United States courts.58
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASES
Ironically, while even the Marshall Islands’ failed American
strategy may reconvene a fascinating judicial dialogue, the ICJ
litigation stands to do nearly the opposite. The following section
will explore the potential long-term detriment to the ICJ.
First, a discussion of the Optional Clause outlines the
Marshall Islands’ anemic jurisdictional claims. The legal merits
of the Marshall Islands’ arguments are analyzed for the unlikely
event that they are reached. The Marshall Islands’ treaty-based,
CIL, and obligation erga omnes arguments are found glaringly
insufficient. Even if the arguments were legally adequate, the
Marshall Islands would have little to pin on the United
Kingdom, and little to pin on India that the ICJ would likely feel
comfortable laying at the feet of a single state. The Marshall
Islands’ only hope on the merits, therefore, is a dramatic about55. See infra Section III(A).
56. E.g., BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).
57. See BG Group, 134 S. Ct.; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,
536 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. See BG Group, 134 S. Ct. at 1198; Kiobel, 113 S. Ct. at 1669; Medellín,
552 U.S. at 536.
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face by the ICJ from its 1996 advisory opinion on the use of
nuclear weapons.59
1. A Failure of Procedure: The Optional Clause and the
Nature of the ICJ’s Compulsory Jurisdiction
The ICJ’s jurisdiction is comprised of “[a]ll cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in
force.”60 The ICJ Charter provides an Optional Clause for states
to embrace the court’s jurisdiction broadly rather than doing so
piecemeal. Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute characterizes the
option as recognizing the court’s jurisdiction “as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement.”61 While the ICJ
characterizes the action of states that accept the Optional
Clause as “recogniz[ing] the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court,”62 this phrase is misleading. The Optional Clause is
specific to “other state[s] accepting the same obligation,” and
constrains the compulsory jurisdiction to legal disputes
concerning four matters:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for
the breach of an international obligation.63
For the purposes of this Article, “recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court” will be referenced as accepting the
Optional Clause.
Today, only one third of U.N. member states accept the
Optional Clause.64 The ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction is
59. See infra Section II(B)(ii).
60. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945,
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
61. Id. ¶ 2.
62. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30.
63. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 2 (elaborating on other states who accept the
similar obligations).
64. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 677 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute Commentary].
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“regarded as a failure.”65 Since the ICJ Charter came into force
nearly sixty years ago, many states found that the terms of the
Optional Clause were too broad.66 The United States initiated a
trend recognizing compulsory jurisdiction with reservations.67
France and India were among the first states to do likewise.68
Presently, most states that submit to the Optional Clause
presently do so with explicit reservations.69
Conveniently, the Marshall Islands accepted the Optional
Clause one year and one day before initiating these proceedings
and, in so doing, registered multiple reservations.70 The timing
of the Marshall Islands’ acceptance demonstrates the length of
planning that went into the ICJ filings. By the language of the
ICJ Statute alone, a state could file an Optional Clause
declaration one day, bring action at the ICJ the next, and
withdraw its declaration on the third day.71 The ICJ Statute
merely requires that states party to ICJ litigation have
declarations in force on the same day.72 Not to be fooled by this
invitation for “hit-and-run” litigation, the United Kingdom’s
reservations include a provision that the ICJ will not have
jurisdiction in any proceeding filed against the United Kingdom
by a state whose declaration was filed less than twelve months
prior to filing its application to bring suit.73
China, France, and the United States each revoked
acceptance of the Optional Clause within thirty years of
65. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 261 (3d ed.
2010).
66. New Declarations of Acceptance by France and India of the Jurisdiction
of the World Court Under Article 36(2) of Its Statute, 1960 DUKE L.J. 84, 84
(1960) [hereinafter New Declarations].
67. Id. 84–85. The first American reservation was that parties, rather than
the ICJ, should determine whether a contingency was raised. Id. The matter
arose in response to Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 27 (July
6).
68. New Declarations, supra note 66.
69. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 677. See also BEDERMAN,
supra note 65, at 259.
70. Press Release, INT’L CT. JUST., Declarations Recognizing the
Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: Marshall Islands, (Apr. 24, 2013), http
://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=MH.
71. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 260.
72. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 2; BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 260 (explaining
the ‘hit-and-run’ characterization).
73. Press Release, INT’L CT. JUST., Declarations Recognizing the
Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=
1&p3=3&code=GB; BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 260.
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submission.74 Today, the United Kingdom is the only permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council that submits to the
Clause.75 Of the nine nuclear weapons states, only the United
Kingdom, India, and Pakistan submit to the optional clause.
While the Marshall Islands brought individual action against
each of the nine states before the ICJ, proceedings were only
certified against the three submitting states.76 The other six
states were invited to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction strictly for
these proceedings and have not done so, effectively ending those
cases.77
Neither India nor Pakistan has ever been party to the NPT.
While the Marshall Islands asserts that India and Pakistan are
bound to the spirit of NPT Article VI through the ICJ’s 1996
advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons,78 the
next section demonstrates that the Marshall Islands’ argument
does not square with the advisory opinion.
2. A Failure on the Merits: Rewriting the 1996 Advisory
Opinion
While the Marshall Islands is unlikely to reach argument on
the merits, given the strength of India and the United Kingdom’s
prospective arguments against jurisdiction, the Marshall
Islands would likely fail on the merits anyhow. Because India is
not party to the NPT, the Marshall Islands could only bring an
argument of facial treaty obligation against the United
74. See infra Section III.
75. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 676.
76. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30.
77. Rep. of the I.C.J., ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/69/4 (Aug. 1, 2014) (“In accordance
with article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, copies of the applications
were transmitted to the Governments of the States concerned, but the new cases
were not entered in the Court’s List and no action will be taken in the
proceedings against any one of those States unless and until it consents to the
Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.”).
78. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30. See also Application Instituting
Proceedings Against the Republic of India, Obligations Concerning
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Pleadings, 18 ¶¶ 42–44 (Apr. 24),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf
[hereinafter
Application
Against India]; Application Instituting Proceedings Against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Obligations Concerning
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Pleadings, 31 ¶¶ 87–89 (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18296.pdf
[hereinafter
Application
Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland].
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Kingdom. To reach beyond the NPT parties, the Marshall
Islands argues that the United Kingdom and India are bound to
the principles of the NPT through attenuated constructions of
obligations erga omnes and customary international law. These
arguments can only be made by re-writing an advisory opinion
issued nearly twenty years prior.
In 1996, the ICJ responded to a request from the United
Nations General Assembly to address whether “the threat or use
of nuclear weapons in any circumstance [was] permitted under
international law.”79 The Marshall Islands contends that the
advisory opinion expressed “customary international law as it
stands today” when the court quoted the NPT.80 A brief review
of the advisory opinion reveals otherwise.
The opinion unanimously affirmed the group-effort
language of the NPT Article VI: “[t]here exists an obligation to
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control.”81 On the matter of the
obligation to pursue disarmament negotiations, the court made
no mention of custom. The prospect of the ICJ leaving such a
landmark expression to derivation is unimaginable.
To the contrary, both the ICJ’s findings and lack of findings
regarding custom were express. The court stated unanimously
that “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional
international law any specific authorization of the threat or use
of nuclear weapons,” and by eleven votes to three, “[t]here is in
neither customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons as such.”82 In a seven-to-seven split won by the
President’s casting vote, the opinion noted an inability to
definitively conclude “whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a
State would be at stake.”83 These holdings demonstrate anything
79. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
80. Application Against India, supra note 78, at 18 ¶¶ 42–44; Application
Against United Kingdom and Norther Ireland, supra note 78, at 31 ¶¶ 87–89.
81. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 226 ¶ 105 (2)F.
82. Id. at (2)A, B.
83. Id. The opinion further expressed that any threat or use of nuclear
weapons must comply with pertinent international laws of armed conflict and
humanitarian law, as well as any pertinent treaties or other legal obligations
(unanimous), while any threat or use contrary to the United Nations Charter is
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but an implied expression of custom.
The Marshall Islands’ erga omnes arguments are hardly
stronger. Obligations erga omnes are those owed to the entire
international community.84 The term means “flowing to all.”85
By contrast, obligations erga omnes partes are more narrowly
construed as owed to a specific subset of states.86 The ICJ rarely
names an obligation erga omnes, and expressly declined
opportunities to do so.87 Here, the Marshall Islands
inappropriately hangs its erga omnes construction on dicta,
using a single footnote to cite a single sentence from then-ICJ
President Bedjaoui’s declaration in the Nuclear Weapons Case.88
President Bedjaoui noted:
As the Court has acknowledged, the obligation to
negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament concerns
the 182 or so States parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. I think one can go beyond that conclusion and
assert that there is in fact a twofold general obligation,
opposable erga omnes, to negotiate in good faith and to
achieve the desired result.89
This non-binding dicta was expressly the judge’s personal
opinion and, more importantly, expressly “beyond [the]
conclusion” of the ICJ.90
The Marshall Islands’ complaint against India (and
Pakistan) incorrectly conflates portions of the 1996 advisory
opinion as stating that every single nation has an obligation erga

unlawful (unanimous). Id.
84. Inna Uchkunova, Belgium v. Senegal: Did the Court End the Dispute
between the Parties?, EJIL: TALK! (July 25, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
belgium-v-senegal-did-the-court-end-the-dispute-between-the-parties/.
85. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Oblatio
Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72 (1996).
86. Uchkunova, supra note 84.
87. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 214 (June 30)
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (“Although in this fashion the erga omnes
principle has played an apparently frequent role in the Court’s recent
jurisprudence, it has not yet drawn a definitive decision from the Court in
relation to the manner in which the principle will operate in case of breach.”).
88. Application Against India, supra note 78, at 17 n.77; Application
Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, supra note 78, at 30 n.122.
89. Marsh. Is. v. India, supra note 80, at 17 n.77; Marsh. Is. v. U.K., supra
note 80, at 30 n.122 (both citing Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, 273–74,
¶ 23).
90. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 272.
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omnes to fulfill the language of the NPT Article VI.91 Just one
year earlier, in yet another case in which jurisdiction was
blocked by a state’s reservations to the Optional Clause, Judge
Weeramantry’s East Timor dissent noted the court’s failure to
ever find a breach of an obligation erga omnes.92 The ICJ’s first
erga omnes finding came more than a decade later in Belgium v.
Senegal, though even that finding was merely obligation erga
omnes partes.93
The Marshall Islands construes its finding by conflating a
slew of phrases from the 1996 opinion as “tantamount” to an
obligation erga omnes. As with the CIL argument, one could
hardly imagine the ICJ leaving anything that it believes reaches
the erga omnes threshold in the shadow of “tantamount”
equation. The ICJ is “very cautious” when handling erga omnes
at all.94 One could imagine a future case in which the ICJ may
hold that testing nuclear weapons violates an obligation erga
omnes for the protection of citizens and the environment alike,
drawing on Judge Weeramantry’s dissent to the 1996 advisory
decision.95 Judge Weeramantry’s East Timor dissent further
asserted that even the Monetary Gold principle does not block
91. Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of India,
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Pleadings, 17 (Apr. 24),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf;
Application
Instituting
Proceedings Against Pakistan, Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating
to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh.
Is. v. Pak.), Pleadings, 15 (Apr. 24), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/159
/18294.pdf.
92. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India),
Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of India, 17 (Apr. 24),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf.
93. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v.
Sen.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422, 449 (July 30) (“These obligations may be
defined as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the sense that each State party has
an interest in compliance with them in any given case.”). See also Uchkunoa,
supra note 84 (citing this case as the first instance of the ICJ finding an
obligation erga omnes, with only one prior finding by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in 1928).
94. Jacob Werksman & Ruth Khalastchi, Nuclear Weapons and Jus Cogens
Peremptory Norms and Justice Preempted?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 183 (Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
95. See Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 517 (Weeramantry, J.,
dissenting) (“The widespread contamination of the environment may even lead
to a nuclear winter and to the destruction of the ecosystem. These results will
ensue equally, whether the nuclear weapons causing them are used in
aggression or in self-defence.”).
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action to enforce obligations erga omnes.96 Still, the Marshall
Islands’ attempt to find an existing erga omnes obligation in the
majority opinions of the advisory opinion is unfounded.
The Marshall Islands contends that the ICJ’s advisory
opinion prescribed this phantom custom and obligation erga
omnes to the world, “not confining its remarks to the States
Parties to the NPT.”97 But nothing in the 1996 opinion states
that the obligations of the NPT Article VI extend beyond the
NPT parties. Alongside interpretations of customary and
conventional international law, the ICJ affirmed the language of
NPT Article VI without citing the NPT and without any
explanation.98 The ICJ’s earlier commentary on the NPT
consistently referenced NPT obligations relative to treaty
parties.
Just before declaring the matters at hand, the final prelude
discussed the NPT language of Article VI. The ICJ took every
opportunity to make its comments specific to states party to the
treaty, using language like “each of the parties,”99 “concerns the
182 States parties,”100 and “need for all States parties.”101
Surely, if the ICJ judges intended to say that the NPT Article VI
language was binding as customary international law, let alone
erga omnes, they would have said so expressly. Finding a
universal obligation to Article VI on behalf of parties and nonparties alike would have conflicted with the ICJ’s unwillingness
to find custom against the possibility of the threat or use in
extreme circumstances of self-defense.102
Even in an opinion critiqued as the ICJ’s attempt to reestablish authority by creating international law at the end of a
century during which the court watched its decline in
prominence,103 the ICJ did not go so far as to assert that every

96. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 102, 173 (Weeramantry, J.,
dissenting).
97. Application Against India, supra note 78, at 18 ¶ 43; Application
Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, supra note 78, at 31 ¶ 88.
98. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 266 ¶ 105 (2)(E).
99. Id. ¶ 99 (quoting the opening language of NPT Article VI, which
establishes that the obligation is party specific).
100. Id. ¶ 100.
101. Id. ¶ 103.
102. Id. ¶ 105 (2)(E) (“[T]he [c]ourt cannot conclude definitively whether the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake.”).
103. See infra Section II. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 36.
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nation in the world is bound by obligations erga omnes to the
language of Article VI. Thus, the Marshall Islands has no legal
footing to argue Article VI obligations from NPT non-parties
India and Pakistan, whether by custom or obligations erga
omnes. The sole viable candidate for NPT accountability in the
ICJ would be the United Kingdom were that measure not futile.
As District Judge Jeffrey White noted in the order
dismissing the Marshall Islands’ complaint against the United
States, the NPT “is silent as to the proper enforcement
mechanism.”104 Moreover, “[t]he Treaty does not create, and the
[U.S. District] Court may not enforce, a bilateral obligation.”105
The NPT did not purport to ban nuclear weapons itself, and the
Marshall Islands cannot simply argue that failure to negotiate
an end to the arms race on its own time somehow violates
measures not present in the NPT.
In sum, the Marshall Islands stand on perilously little legal
ground asserting ICJ jurisdiction in the cases against India and
the United Kingdom, let alone in successfully arguing on the
merits. Those things established, the greater possible outcome
of the legal campaign is a threat of the ICJ’s already-waning
legitimacy.
III. THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE ICJ IS IN
JEOPARDY
Before considering the potential ramifications of the
Marshall Islands’ legal action, the current pulse of the ICJ must
be taken. This section identifies the ICJ’s prime in the rearview
mirror. That backward glance sets the stage for Section IV’s
accounts of major powers abstaining and withdrawing from the
Optional Clause.
The ICJ embodies an attempt to capture a lofty ideal in a
grandiose palace with beautiful gardens, set back from a quiet
street in a charming city. Unfortunately, however, the court
outlived the mid-twentieth century idealism of its inception. The
ICJ’s Charter fundamentally establishes jurisdiction for
advisory proceedings and contentious cases.106 Advisory

104. Marsh. Is. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1074 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
105. Id. at 1072.
106. See ICJ Statute art. 36.
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proceedings can hardly be enforced.107 The ICJ’s jurisdiction
over contentious proceedings of first instance108 encompasses
cases of special agreement,109 treaty or convention-based
cases,110 cases in which all state parties submit to the Optional
Clause for compulsory jurisdiction,111 and cases in which a state
which does not accept the Optional Clause grants jurisdiction to
the ICJ on an ad hoc basis for the specific proceeding.112
In cases of special agreement, “the ICJ is just a glorified
arbitration panel,” and an unsung arbitration panel at that.113
Since 1949, the ICJ has heard just eighteen special agreement
cases, only four of which involved a major power.114 Treaty- or
convention-based cases are hardly brought either. Since 1946,
the rate at which states enter treaties with clauses granting ICJ
jurisdiction has consistently decreased.115
Given the anemic state of all other forms of ICJ jurisdiction,
acceptances of the Optional Clause are arguably the gold
standard of the ICJ’s legitimacy. Compounding misfortune, the
ICJ does not appear thrilled to ground its jurisdiction in the
Optional Clause.116 This section contends that the ICJ’s
legitimacy is already in jeopardy, such that the loss of India’s or
the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the Optional Clause would
be a substantial blow. The court’s authority arguably peaked
nearly a century ago, during its identity as the PCIJ, and recent
107. See supra Section II(B)(2).
108. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 6. Aside from matters of first instance, the ICJ
Charter also permits jurisdiction to interpret or revise a judgment. Id. at art.
60.
109. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 1.
110. Id.
111. Id. at art. 36, ¶¶ 2–5.
112. See Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, (d) Forum Prorogatum, INT’L CT.
JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2#2 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2016).
113. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 9 (John
M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 233, 2004), http://www.
law.uchicago.edu/files/files/233.eap_.icj_.pdf.
114. See List of Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF
JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Jan. 8,
2016) (special agreement cases are noted by a forward slash between party
names). The four instances of major power participation were Minquiers and
Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed.
Republic Ger./Neth.), 1967 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed.
Republic Ger./Den.), 1967 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); and Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). Id.
115. Posner, supra note 113, at 9.
116. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261.
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gains in state acceptances of the Optional Clause do not begin to
outweigh the withdrawals. Not to say that there is no hope for a
change of course; only acknowledging that the ICJ has not seen
an uptick of legitimacy in years.
A. THE ICJ’S MOST AUTHORITATIVE DAYS ARE BEHIND IT
The ICJ is not what the Permanent Court of International
Justice was in its Roaring Twenties heyday, nor has it
consistently attempted to maintain the same authority.117 In the
1920s, the court presented itself “like a national supreme court,
[and] international law like national law.”118 “Today, this image
is more common in Europe than in the United States, and in the
polemics of advocacy than in academic commentary.”119 After
1945, the ICJ became an organ of the United Nations120—a
system “languishing now in the chaos of institutional
proliferation, non-stop budgetary crises and internal reforms.”121
While the U.N. Charter deems the ICJ its “principal judicial
organ,”122 submission to the ICJ is entirely separate from
admission to the United Nations,123 placing the court’s authority
in a precarious position from the start. Hopes for a “tight
network” of states submitting to the court’s jurisdiction never
materialized under the League of Nations or the United
Nations.124 That said, requiring compulsory jurisdiction of all
United Nations members would only lead to a parade of
unenforced judgments.125 Because the ICJ lacks a solid
enforcement mechanism, the only available choices are a few
freely consenting states abiding by judgments or unenforceable
universal jurisdiction. From 1951–2004, there was only one ICJ
case in which jurisdiction was clearly grounded in the Optional
Clause, the court sided with the applicant, and the respondent

117. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate
opinion of Judge Alvarez) (characterizing the ICJ as an “international social
function of a psychological character”).
118. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 464.
119. Id.
120. The Court: History, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?p1=1&p2=1 (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
121. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 463.
122. U.N. Charter art. 92.
123. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 647.
124. Id. at 676.
125. Id. at 648.
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complied with the judgment.126
Even in the words of an ICJ judge, the court is an
“international social function of a psychological character.”127
Over the course of the twentieth century, the ICJ has digressed
to be “one cultural and political institution among others,
crafting its [nuclear weapons] decision to enhance its legitimacy
and pull towards compliance, the decision a drop in the ocean of
world public opinion.”128
The dawn of specialized courts provides another reason why
the ICJ lost de facto authority. Fewer cases had reason to come
to the ICJ once European nations—the ICJ’s great
champions129—created their own Court of Human Rights with
far stronger jurisdictional authority.130 Separate courts were
created for international criminal conflicts, the Law of the Sea,
conflict in Lebanon, the Rwandan genocide, atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia, and for international arbitration—none of
which cede appellate jurisdiction to the ICJ. These courts carved
authority squarely out of the original vision for the ICJ’s
authority as the final word on matters of international law. The
ICJ’s oft-used title as ‘World Court’ would require a remarkably
involved asterisk to account for every type of international legal
dispute outside the court’s jurisdiction.
In sum, the ICJ has no surplus of legitimacy. There is no
plausible outcome in which the Marshall Islands’ cases will
increase the piecemeal authority of the ICJ. Cases that
acknowledge a lack of jurisdiction may not seem significant. To
the contrary, United States federal courts routinely dismiss
cases for lack of jurisdiction. Forcing the ICJ to acknowledge its
lack of jurisdiction over something as intuitively within its
authority as multilateral treaty enforcement, however,
highlights the ICJ’s greater failure to maintain the grand
authority for which it was designed.
B. GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE GOLD STANDARD OF THE ICJ’S
LEGITIMACY: SUBMISSION TO COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
Aside from the ICJ’s failure to launch, and the de facto loss
126. Posner, supra note 113, at 8 n.14.
127. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 464 (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9)).
128. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 464.
129. Id.
130. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 711.
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of jurisdiction in the face of new regional and subject matterspecific courts, major powers’ late twentieth century
withdrawals and permitted lapses in their Optional Clause
declarations further cut against the ICJ’s legitimacy.
By 1950, shortly after the ICJ Statute came into force, sixty
percent of states accepted the Optional Clause.131 While the total
number of states accepting the Optional Clause increased in
time, the proportion of states dwindled to thirty-four percent.132
Some see encouragement in gains from former socialist states.133
Most of the gains came from small states like Barbados, Togo,
and Costa Rica, though larger players like Germany and
Australia also signed on in recent years.134 Nevertheless,
successful invocation of the Optional Clause decreased. Only
four victories on the merits occurred from 1946–1965, eleven
from 1966–1985, and three from 1986–2004.135
From 1951–2005, thirteen state declarations on the ICJ’s
jurisdiction expired or were terminated and not replaced.136
Turkey allowed its submission to lapse in 1972,137 as did a
handful of other smaller nations.138 These losses pale in
comparison to the Optional Clause revocation of three major
world powers in the late twentieth century. Section IV recounts
how three major powers’ Optional Clause declaration
revocations came to pass, parsing for clues as to how the United
Kingdom and India may respond to the Marshall Islands’ legal
action before the ICJ. As this section revealed, the ICJ’s
legitimacy is in dicey enough shape that either state’s
withdrawal would be a substantial blow.
IV. PRIOR REVOCATIONS BY WORLD POWERS
Some say the ICJ is “being abandoned by the major
131. Posner, supra note 113, at 8.
132. Id. at n.14.
133. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 676.
134. Id. at 676–77.
135. Posner, supra note 113, at 8.
136. 59 I.C.J. Y.B. 107, 113 n.1 (2004–2005) (listing declarations from
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Iran, Israel,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States).
137. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction:
The Case for Closing the Clause, AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 n.9 (1987).
138. Anthony Giustini, Compulsory Adjudication in International Law: The
Past, the Present, and Prospects for the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 213, 237
(1985).
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powers,”139 and that “all in all, the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction
has been regarded as a failure.”140 “The practice under the
Optional Clause has confirmed the fact that relatively few states
are inclined to use the [c]ourt.”141 Further, states that revoked
submission to the Optional Clause were hardly making much
use of it beforehand. Among the ten state members with the
largest economies, two have never been respondents in an ICJ
case beyond the filing stage, let alone brought action
themselves.142
On one extreme of the major powers, Russia has never
accepted the Optional Clause; on the other, the United Kingdom
hangs on to this day.143 States who maintain declarations
pursuant to the Optional Clause “are regarded as targets of
opportunity” by aggrieved nations.144 The other three permanent
Security Council members, China, France, and the United
States, each revoked acceptance of the Optional Clause over the
course of the 1970s and 1980s.145 As discussed infra, China is an
outlier because its revocation was a function of the rise of the
People’s Republic of China.146
In the experience of both France and the United States—
and perhaps in the forthcoming experience of the United
Kingdom and/or India—a major power walked away from the
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in response to legal action from a
particularly small nation. These instances illustrate a growing
139. Posner, supra note 113, at 6.
140. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261.
141. Giustini, supra note 138, at 236.
142. Posner, supra note 113, at 6 (“[C]onsider the countries that currently
have the ten largest economies: USA, China, Japan, India, Germany, U.K.,
France, Italy, Brazil, and Russia. Four of these states—China, Japan, Brazil,
and Russia (U.S.S.R.)—have never brought a proceeding, and never been a
respondent beyond the filing stage.”). See also List of Contentious Cases by Date
of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index
.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (stating that after Posner’s paper
was written, Japan was a respondent in Australia v. Japan in 2010 and Russia
was a respondent in Georgia v. Russian Federation in 2008).
143. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 676 (stating that “Russia
(formerly the Soviet Union) . . . have never submitted to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ according to Art. 36, para. 2”). See also 1 I.C.J. Y.B. 195,
212 (1946–1947) (statement of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) (“On
behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, I now declare that
they accept as compulsory ipso facto . . . the jurisdiction of the Court, in
conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court . . . .”).
144. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261.
145. E.g., Giustini, supra note 138.
146. See infra Section IV(A).
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trend of small and relatively weak states dragging major powers
into the ICJ.147 While facially ironic, the ICJ is blind to state
size—at least in theory. Counsel for the United States delivered
this message before the ICJ during the case that led to
withdrawal from the Optional Clause:
Nicaragua’s assertion that it is small and weak and the
United States large and powerful. Nicaragua’s request
would have this court violate the most fundamental tenet
of modern international law; the equality of sovereign
States before the law. That tenet respects the right of the
weak as well as the powerful, the small as well as the
large. Indeed, the States best served by a rigorous
adherence to the principle of equality as well as to the
rule of law in general are the small and the weak. Any
departure from those principles ultimately adversely
affects them the most.148
In that case, the United States responded initially in the
precise manner that India is now responding; addressing the
lack of jurisdiction by arguing that its reservations to the
Optional Clause barred the proceedings.149 A thorough
recollection of how France and the United States proceeded in
the face of contentious proceedings before the ICJ may provide
insight into how India and the United Kingdom will respond to
the Marshall Islands.

147. Posner, supra note 113, at 7. (“In the first twenty year period [1946–
1965], a major power was an applicant in 60 percent of the cases, and a
respondent in 60 percent of the cases. In the second period [1966–1985], a major
power was an applicant a little under 50 percent of the time, and a respondent
a little under 50 percent of the time . . . . In the last period [1986–2004], a major
power was an applicant in only 13 percent of the cases; a major power was a
defendant in 100 percent of the cases.”). See also List of Contentious Cases by
date of introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.
php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015).
148. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE
AFTER FIFTY YEARS 11 (A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997).
149. See Press Release 2014/22, supra note 33 (“[B]y a letter dated 6 June
2014, the Ambassador of the Republic of India to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands informed the Court, inter alia, that ‘India . . . considers that the
International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in the alleged
dispute.’”).
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A. CHINA REVOKED ACCEPTANCE FOR COMMUNISM
In 1946, China accepted the Optional Clause without
reservation.150 Within a year of France withdrawing its
acceptance of the Optional Clause, China withdrew as well.
China’s motivations were the result of a new political regime
rather than reactive to a particular case. The United Nations
General Assembly voted to recognize the People’s Republic of
China as the representative Chinese authority in 1971.151 The
next year, the Chinese government submitted a letter to the
United Nations stating that it did not recognize the former
Chinese government’s statement accepting the Optional
Clause.152 As other major powers withdrew from the Optional
Clause in coming years, their circumstances would prove more
contentious.
B. FRANCE REACTED TO A CONTENTIOUS CASE FROM NEW
ZEALAND
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Australia and New
Zealand made vain efforts to stop French atmospheric nuclear
weapons tests in the South Pacific.153 The Prime Minister of New
Zealand wrote the President of France in May 1973, giving
notice that New Zealand intended to take the matter to the
ICJ.154 New Zealand made good on its word within a week,
submitting an initial ICJ application.155 France renounced its
acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in January
150. 1 I.C.J. Y.B. 195, 218 (1946–1947).
151. Phil C.W. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law Since the
Opium War, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 882 (2014).
152. 27 I.C.J. Y.B. 46, 52 (1972–1973) (“[B]y letter of 5 September 1972 the
Government of the People’s Republic of China indicated that it ‘does not
recognize the statement made by the defunct Chinese government on 26
October 1946 . . . concerning the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court.’”). See also WEIXING HU, GERALD CHAN, & DAOJIONG ZHA, CHINA’S
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DYNAMICS OF PARADIGM
SHIFTS 186 (2000).
153. Don MacKay, Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the
International Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1857, 1863 (1995).
154. Id.
155. Nuclear Tests Cases (N.Z. v. Fr.), Pleadings 3 (May 9), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/59/9447.pdf. See also MacKay, supra note 153, at 1863
(“Subsequently, on May 14th, a Request by New Zealand for Interim Measures
of Protection was lodged with the Court. Australia filed a parallel but not
identical case.”).
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1974.156 That May, the French ambassador to the Netherlands
wrote that France found the ICJ “manifestly” incompetent to
hear the case.157 The letter further stated that France had no
intention to appoint an agent in the case, and requested that the
ICJ withdraw the matter from its case list.158 The ICJ requested
memorials from each nation on the matter of jurisdiction.159 New
Zealand complied, and France abstained from participation.160
Ultimately, the proceedings were rendered moot because France
seemed to intend to cease its atmospheric tests.161 The resulting
withdrawal of France’s submission to the Optional Clause was
permanent.
Still, France maintains a noteworthy interaction with the
ICJ since revocation. In 2002, the Republic of the Congo initiated
proceedings against France, disputing French criminal
proceedings.162 As in the present case, France was invited to
submit to the court’s jurisdiction for that case alone. France
consented exclusively to “the claims formulated by the Republic
of the Congo.”163 Careful to avoid even the impression of creating
156. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Memorial of the Republic of France 2,
http://www.amun.org/final/03/ICJ_France_Memorial.pdf. See also MacKay,
supra note 153, at 1866 (“France subsequently moved to denounce the General
Act, and also to remove itself entirely from the compulsory jurisdiction . . .
months after Australia and New Zealand initiated their proceedings.”).
157. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 4 (Dec. 20) (“By
a letter dated 16 May 1973 from the Ambassador of France to the Netherlands,
handed by him to the Registrar the same day, the French Government stated
that, for reasons set out in the letter and an Annex thereto, it considered that
the Court was manifestly not competent in the case.”).
158. Id.
159. Id. ¶ 6.
160. Id. ¶ 6. E.g., Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility Submitted by
the Government of New Zealand (N.Z. v. Fr.) (Oct. 29), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/59/9451.pdf. See also Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction and
Justiciability, 1974 I.C.J. 250, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/59/9453.pdf
(statement of counsel for the Government of New Zealand) (“No representative
of the French Government is present in [c]ourt.”).
161. E.g., Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, supra note 157.
162. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Application
Instituting Proceedings, 3 (Apr. 11), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/7067.
pdf.
163. Press Release 2010/36, INT’L CT. JUST., Certain Criminal Proceedings
in France (Republic of the Congo v. France) Case Removed from the Court’s List
at the Request of the Republic of the Congo (Nov. 17), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/129/16233.pdf (“By a letter dated 8 April 2003 and received
in the Registry on 11 April 2003, France stated that . . . its consent to the Court’s
jurisdiction applied strictly within the limits ‘of the claims formulated by the
Republic of the Congo.’”). See also Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the French Republic (Consent to the Jurisdiction of the Court to Entertain
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jurisdiction on any other grounds, France further highlighted
that “Article 2 of the Treaty of Co-operation signed on 1 January
1974 by the French Republic and the People’s Republic of the
Congo, to which the latter refers in its Application, does not
constitute a basis of jurisdiction for the Court in the present
case.”164 While the proceedings would have presented an
intriguing case study in one-off submission to ICJ jurisdiction,
the Republic of the Congo withdrew its application initiating
proceedings in 2010.165 France, of course, replied expressing no
objection to the withdrawal.166
C. THE UNITED STATES REACTED TO A CONTENTIOUS CASE
FROM NICARAGUA
One decade after France, the United States terminated its
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction amidst similar
circumstances. The American exit was prompted by a
contentious case brought by Nicaragua over military and
paramilitary activity. The United States involved itself in
overthrowing the leftist Sandinistas regime in Nicaragua, and
Nicaragua asserted that American intervention violated
international law.167 Unlike France, the United States made
preemptive attempts to skirt the matter before withdrawing its
submission to compulsory jurisdiction entirely. Days before
Nicaragua filed its ICJ application, the United States informed
the United Nations Secretary-General that its submission to
compulsory jurisdiction would not apply to proceedings involving
Central American nations.168 Once in court, the U.S. team
compounded its argument by asserting that Nicaragua lacked
the Application Pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 5 of the Rules of Court) to
the International Court of Justice (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/129/13344.pdf (French only).
164. Press Release 2010/36, supra note 163 (“In its letter, France added that
. . . ‘Article 2 of the Treaty of Co-operation signed on 1 January 1974 by the
French Republic and the People’s Republic of the Congo, to which the latter
refers in its Application, does not constitute a basis of jurisdiction for the Court
in the present case.’”). See also Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the French Republic, supra note 163.
165. See Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 635 (Nov. 16), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/16266.pdf.
166. Id.
167. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 233.
168. Monroe Leigh, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States of America), 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 442, 442
(1985).
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standing because the state never submitted to the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction itself.169 The ICJ was not swayed, and
issued a judgment that the case was properly brought under
both the ICJ Statute and a treaty between the United States and
Nicaragua.170 The United States responded by withdrawing
from the Optional Clause entirely, technically defaulting on the
merits of the case, but paying no mind.171 Explaining its
decision, the U.S. Department of State wrote:
In 1946 we accepted the risks of our submitting to the
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction because we believed that
the respect owed to the Court by other states and the
Court’s own appreciation of the need to adhere
scrupulously to its proper judicial role, would prevent the
Court’s process from being abused for political ends.
Those assumptions have now been proved wrong.172
The episode did not conclude solely in the superpower’s
Optional Clause declaration withdrawal. Procedurally, the
matter was complicated by the United States’ failed Hail Mary
to qualify the limits of its Optional Clause declaration. In
response, a slew of nations subsequently altered the language of
their own Optional Clause declarations, reserving the right to
immediate withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction.173 Those
nations included Australia, Cyprus, Guinea, Nigeria, Peru,
Slovakia, Germany, and most notably, the United Kingdom.174
D. CONCLUSION ON WITHDRAWALS
Of the three NPT party nuclear weapon states to submit to
the Optional Clause, three distinct withdrawal strategies were
displayed. China withdrew immediately before any
entanglement could occur at the ICJ. France withdrew nearly as
soon as a contentious case was filed against it, not waiting for

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 233.
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER
FIFTY YEARS 117, 129 n.50 (A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997) (citing Department of
State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ
Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M. 1742, 1744 (1985)).
173. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 680 n.271.
174. Id.
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the ICJ to request jurisdictional submissions.175 The United
States attempted to untimely alter its reservation, then objected
to the applicant state’s standing, then waited for the ICJ to
determine its jurisdiction, and withdrew after losing that
battle.176 The next sections will estimate where the United
Kingdom or India may find themselves along this continuum.
V.

WILL THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHDRAW?

The United Kingdom keeps a low profile before the ICJ. The
United Kingdom has only been an applicant before the ICJ in
four cases (excluding special agreement actions), the last of
which was filed in 1972.177 Likewise, the United Kingdom has
only been a respondent in four cases (excluding special
agreement actions), the last of which was filed in 1999, and none
of which were filed by major powers.178 The United Kingdom’s
absence from the ICJ may be the result of the European Court
of Human Rights, displacing much of the United Kingdom’s need
for a supranational court and providing more reliable
jurisdiction.179
This section will begin by exploring the procedural
weakness of the Marshall Islands’ argument for jurisdiction
against the United Kingdom, then the weakness of the legal and
factual merits of the argument, concluding with the likelihood
that all this argumentation could cause the United Kingdom to
withdraw its submission to the Optional Clause entirely.

175. See supra Section IV(B).
176. See supra Section IV(C).
177. Posner, supra note 113, at 6–7 tbl.2. Those cases were United Kingdom
v. Albania (1947), United Kingdom v. Norway (1949), United Kingdom v. Iran
(1951), and United Kingdom v. Iceland (1972). Id. While Posner’s piece is more
than a decade old, the United Kingdom has not filed any additional applications
for contentious proceedings before the ICJ since 2004. See List of Contentious
Cases by Date of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
178. Posner, supra note 113, at 6–7 tbl.2. Those cases were Greece v. United
Kingdom (1951), Cameroon v. United Kingdom (1961), Libya v. United
Kingdom (1992), and Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom (1999). Id. Outside of the
Marshall Islands’ 2014 filing, no state has filed any additional applications for
contentious proceedings against the United Kingdom since 2004. See List of
Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, supra note 114.
179. See ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 711 (noting the firm
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights—innately connected to the
treaties it is charged with enforcing—in comparison to the ICJ’s “consensual
regime,” which the author characterizes as outdated).
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Procedurally, this section finds that the United Kingdom’s
untested reservation to its Optional Clause declaration could be
interpreted for or against the Marshall Islands; and that a loss
on the procedural matter of jurisdiction alone could be grounds
for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal, if following the United
States’ tactics. Withdrawal would be considered defaulting on
the merits, though it would still mean that the judgment would
be unrecognized by the United Kingdom, furthering the
tradition of unenforced ICJ judgments.180
Still, if the ICJ finds jurisdiction, the United Kingdom may
stick around unthreatened because arguments against the legal
and factual merits of the case are so strong. Even setting aside
the precedent that obligations erga omnes cannot be enforced
when all states allegedly at fault are not party to the
proceedings,181 the United Kingdom is a model party to the
NPT.182
This section finds no footing for the Marshall Islands on the
factual merits: the United Kingdom’s significant reduction of
nuclear arms is openly acknowledged by the United Kingdom’s
government and non-governmental organizations alike.183
Moreover, there is no way around the United Kingdom’s
commitment to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, or its signing and
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty a decade
before the Marshall Islands did so. If the United Kingdom bows
out of the Optional Clause, it will likely do so after the
jurisdiction is decided.
A. LOSING ON PROCEDURE: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S HISTORY
BEFORE THE ICJ
As the only permanent member of the Security Council
currently submitting to the Optional Clause,184 the United
Kingdom maintains a sophisticated set of reservations in its
declaration.185 The aforementioned provision denying
180. See Posner, supra note 113, at 8 n.14; supra Section III(A).
181. See discussion of Monetary Gold infra Section V(C).
182. See infra Section V(B).
183. Id.
184. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 259.
185. See Chapter 1 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 4. Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Under Article 36, Paragraph
2, of the Statute of the Court, Texts of the Declarations, United Kingdom of Great
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jurisdiction in “hit-and-run” cases186 is not the only ace up the
United Kingdom’s sleeve. As the United Kingdom saw in the
present case, the Marshall Islands was willing to submit to
compulsory jurisdiction and wait a year to file action just to
comply with the opposition’s compulsory jurisdiction
declaration.187 Not to be beaten at its own game, the United
Kingdom updated its reservations to compulsory jurisdiction
eight months after the Marshall Islands filed suit.188 The United
Kingdom added a reservation excluding compulsory jurisdiction
in “any dispute which is substantially the same as a dispute
previously submitted to the Court by the same or another
Party.”189
On June 15, 2015, the United Kingdom filed timely
preliminary objections to the case.190 In accordance with ICJ
procedure, the details of the objections were not made public,
though they are assumedly regarding jurisdiction.191 The
Marshall Islands was granted the standard four months to
respond.192
The new reservation seems specially tailored to block the
Marshall Islands’ case. The Marshall Islands’ filings against the
United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan are nearly identical.193
However, because the Marshall Islands filed contemporaneous
action against all nine nuclear weapons states, the Marshall
Islands could argue that the United Kingdom’s reservation does
not apply against its case because of the “previously submitted”

Britain and Northern Ireland, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=I-4&
chapter=1&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Texts of
the U.K. Declarations].
186. See supra Section II(B)(1).
187. Id.
188. See Texts of the U.K. Declarations, supra note 185. The updated
reservations were filed on December 31, 2014. Id.
189. Id. at ch. 1 § 4. As part of this update, the United Kingdom also stated
that it would accept compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising after January
1, 1984, updating this date from its prior 2004 declaration, which recognized
disputes arising after January 1, 1974. Id.
190. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order,
¶ 5 (June 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18710.pdf.
191. See Rules of Court, supra note 6.
192. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order,
supra note 190, at ¶¶ 8–9.
193. See Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30.
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language.194 The ICJ found against Japan on similar
jurisdictional questions within the past decade.195
If argued, the “previously submitted” language could burn
the United Kingdom in the same manner as Japan. Because the
ICJ has had no prior opportunity to interpret the United
Kingdom’s new reservation, the court’s interpretation for the
matter at hand cannot be assessed with precision. If the United
Kingdom’s presumed argument against jurisdiction is denied,
the nation could imaginably go the way of France or the United
States, withdrawing entirely from submission to the Optional
Clause, rather than face a potentially strong ruling from the ICJ.
Again, because the United Kingdom’s reservations include a
provision for immediate effect after withdrawal,196 the United
Kingdom would not be left adrift waiting out its own action as
the United States was against Nicaragua.197 Again, if the United
Kingdom does argue against the ICJ’s jurisdiction in any form,
the strategy not to do so up front, as India did, is curious.198
B. LOSING ON THE MERITS: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S HISTORY
WITH THE NPT
The merits of the Marshall Islands’ case against the United
Kingdom are just as weak as the procedure. While the Marshall
Islands can argue NPT breach against the United Kingdom, the
United Kingdom has arguably acted as a model nuclear weapon
state in terms of treaty compliance. To public knowledge, the
United Kingdom has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1991.199
194. Texts of the U.K. Declarations, supra note 185, at ch. 1 § 4.
195. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan, N.Z. intervening),
Judgment, ¶¶ 32–41 (Mar. 31), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf
(rejecting Japan’s contention that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction because the
dispute fell under one of Australia’s Optional Clause reservations).
196. See Texts of the U.K. Declarations, supra note 185, at 2.
197. See supra Section IV(C).
198. Compare Press Release 2014/22, supra note 33, at ¶ 4 (“[b]y a letter
dated 6 June 2014, the Ambassador of the Republic of India to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands informed the Court, inter alia, that ‘India . . . considers that
the International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in the alleged
dispute.’”) with Press Release 2014/21, INT’L CT. JUST., Obligations Concerning
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Fixing of Time-Limits for Filing of Initial
Pleadings (June 19, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18332.pdf
(providing no mention of jurisdiction arguments).
199. BESFORT T. RRECAJ, POLITICS OF LEGAL REGIMES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
IN THE ASPECT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 57 (2014).
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Even the Nuclear Threat Initiative acknowledges that “[t]he
British government has progressively reduced its nuclear
weapons stockpile.”200
In October 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron
presented a Strategic Defence and Security Review to
Parliament.201 Among other things, the study reassessed what
nuclear arsenal was necessary for “credible deterrence” in light
of the international order.202 Finding that a smaller arsenal
would suffice for credible deterrence, the government announced
plans to reduce its requirement for “operationally available
warheads” by twenty-five percent, and reduce its overall nuclear
weapon stockpile, among other actions.203 Even if the Marshall
Islands were able to argue the non-existent unilateral obligation
from the United Kingdom to the island nation, the Marshall
Islands would be hard pressed to argue that the United Kingdom
has not made sufficient strides to further nuclear nonproliferation.
The United Kingdom is a state party to the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.204 A December 2014
statement by the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative
to the United Nations in Vienna emphasized the difference of
NPT interpretation between the United Kingdom and the

200. United
Kingdom
Profile,
NUCLEAR
THREAT
INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-kingdom/ (last updated Oct. 2014)
(noting that “there has been no attempt to reduce the role of nuclear weapons
in the military and security doctrines of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council,” and that “Britain is about to commit to modernising its
forces”).
201. CABINET OFFICE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, SECURING BRITAIN IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW 38
(2010) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf.
202. Id. at 38.
203. Id. (stating “reduce our requirement for operationally available
warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120”).
204. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480
U.N.T.S. 43; Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature
Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439. See App’x III, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty & Partial Test Ban Treaty, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/apmctbt_2.pdf?_=1328040541&_=1328040541
(last updated Jan. 17, 2012), for a list of current signatories of both treaties. The
U.K. ratified the Comprehensive Treaty eleven years before the Marshall
Islands. Id.
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Marshall Islands:
Some have argued that the way to this goal is to ban
nuclear weapons now, or to fix a timetable for their
elimination. The UK considers that this approach fails to
take account of, and therefore jeopardises, the stability
and security which nuclear weapons can help to
ensure. A declaratory ban, or a timetable not
underpinned by the necessary trust, confidence and
verification measures, would jeopardise strategic
stability. None of us would gain from a loss of that
stability.205
The representative went on to defend fellow major powers,
drawing attention to collective reductions of stockpiles between
the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom alike.206
Whether viewed alone or relative to other nuclear weapons
states, short of the argument that the mere continued existence
of nuclear weapons constitutes an NPT breach, anyone would
have a hard time arguing that the United Kingdom is
noncompliant to the NPT—let alone the Marshall Islands’
irresponsibly construed obligation erga omnes to “pursue in good
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.”207
C. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES
COMPARED TO PAST OPTIONAL CLAUSE WITHDRAWALS
Among the Optional Clause revocations, the United
Kingdom’s present stance is most analogous to the United
States’ experience. The United Kingdom sent representation to
a preliminary meeting with the ICJ President in June 2014.208
That act is distinguishable from French non-engagement.

205. Susan le Jeune d’Allegeershecque, U.K. Permanent Representative to
the U.N. in Vienna, U.K. Intervention at the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons 2014 Conference (Dec. 9, 2014), transcript https://www.gov.uk/
government/world-location-news/uk-intervention-at-the-vienna-conference-onthe-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons.
206. Id.
207. Application Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, supra note
78, at pt. 1 ¶ 3.
208. June 16, 2014 Order, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 7–8.
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Because the United Kingdom’s Optional Clause declaration has
such strong reservation language, the state is likely to have
confidence in its preliminary argument against jurisdiction.
The United Kingdom chose to stick around for the
jurisdiction arguments as the United States did, assumedly
hoping that the case will be dismissed. The United States
withdrew after unsuccessfully arguing against jurisdiction, and
the United Kingdom may do the same if its own arguments fail.
After all, as the only permanent Security Council member
currently submitting to the ICJ, the United Kingdom’s
withdrawal from the Optional Clause is not likely to prompt an
image problem or inconvenience its judicial needs.
The United Kingdom seems to have little to fear on the
merits, though the sheer shock of reaching the merits may give
enough pause for the United Kingdom to weigh the risk of
continuing to submit to the Optional Clause. While the Marshall
Islands can only argue attenuated customary international law
breaches against India or Pakistan, the Marshall Islands can
compound the CIL case with treaty breach argument against the
United Kingdom. Luckily, given that there is some small risk to
reaching the merits, the United Kingdom may be able to argue
in the alternative against the case.
Still, if arguments against jurisdiction fail, the United
Kingdom could also pose a separate argument to avoid the
merits. In 1954, the ICJ decided Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome in 1943, known as the “Monetary Gold Case.”209 Italy
brought action against France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States for priority ownership of Albanian gold seized for
World War II restitution.210 Italy’s first request was an opinion
from the court on jurisdiction.211 At that point, each of the
defendant states submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ. Reservations in Optional Clause declarations were not yet
in vogue,212 so none were raised. However, India raised an
interrelated claim against Albania, which did not accept the
Optional Clause. The ICJ found unanimously that it could not
adjudicate the claims against Albania absent Albania’s consent
209. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.),
1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15).
210. See generally Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Case of the Monetary Gold Removed
from Rome in 1943, 48 AM. J. INT’L L. 649 (1954) (analyzing and excerpting the
opinion).
211. Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 22.
212. See New Declarations, supra note 66, at 84–85 and accompanying text.
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to jurisdiction.213
Then, by a vote of thirteen to one, the court held that it could
not decide the interrelated issues concerning France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States without deciding the greater
issue concerning all the parties.214 Therefore, Albania’s lack of
Optional Clause acceptance kept the entire case out of the
ICJ.215 While some could contrast the Nicaragua v. U.S.
decision, in which the ICJ dismissed the American objection that
Nicaragua lacked standing for not submitting to the Optional
Clause, the position of the parties distinguishes the cases.216
Nicaragua arguably submitted to the international equivalent of
personal jurisdiction by bringing its case before the ICJ, whereas
Albania was a respondent whose actions could not be construed
as submitting to the court’s jurisdiction.
The United Kingdom could argue the same principle today.
Given the communal nature of the requirements of the NPT
Article VI—a commitment to dialogue among nations rather
than unilateral action—how could the ICJ rule on the United
Kingdom’s compliance when six of the nine nuclear weapons
states do not accept the Optional Clause and have not accepted
the court’s invitations to accept jurisdiction in this matter?
If the United Kingdom were to make and lose a Monetary
Gold argument, the state would be foolish not to withdraw its
Optional Clause declaration. The prospect of being held
responsible for other states’ collective actions would be a
dangerous precedent. Luckily, should the United Kingdom feel
inclined to withdraw consent entirely, the United Kingdom
currently reserves the right to do so with immediate effect,
unlike the United States.217
Bottom line, short of the United Kingdom arguing against
jurisdiction and the ICJ agreeing, this case will not provide the
United Kingdom any good reason to maintain Optional Clause
submission. The United Kingdom may already have one foot out
the door as is given the absence of any other permanent Security
Council members from Optional Clause submission. Drawing
from the French experience, the United Kingdom could rest
assured that its withdrawal would not foreclose the option of
submitting to the ICJ’s jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis in
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Lissitzyn, supra note 210.
Id.
Id. at 653.
See supra Section IV(C).
ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 680–81 n.271.
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matters of optional jurisdiction.218 Optional Clause withdrawal,
ironically, would simply make such jurisdiction optional. Any
trouble from the Marshall Islands’ case may be an all-toowelcome prompting for the United Kingdom to withdraw its
reservation.
VI. WILL INDIA WITHDRAW?
Like France and the United States, and unlike the United
Kingdom in this case, India responded to the Marshall Islands
by arguing that one of India’s reservations barred the case.219
India has a one-for-one record arguing that its reservations bar
ICJ jurisdiction.220 Procedurally, the battle over jurisdiction in
Marshall Islands v. India is any state’s game. This section will
demonstrate the open question of jurisdiction through a brief
recollection of India’s four contentious cases before the ICJ.
Procedure undecided, this section addresses the merits of the
Marshall Islands’ case by considering India’s unique
relationship with the NPT and with nuclear weapons generally,
particularly its ongoing development of new nuclear weapons.
Ultimately, the merits of the Marshall Islands’ case against
India may be strong enough to prompt India to consider
withdrawing from the Optional Clause before the ICJ could rule
against it, though implications for external international
relations dynamics must be taken into account—particularly
India’s campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council.
A. LOSING ON PROCEDURE: INDIA’S HISTORY BEFORE THE ICJ
India has been a party to four contentious filings before the
ICJ. India was a respondent in contentious cases filed by
Portugal (1955) and Pakistan (1973 and 1999), and an applicant
against Pakistan in 1971.221 Foreshadowing how India will
218. See supra Section IV(B).
219. See Press Release 2014/22, supra note 33, ¶ 4.
220. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 1957
I.C.J. 125 (Nov. 26) (lost); Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India),
Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 21) (won); Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction
of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), Judgment, 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18) (not
raised); Trial of the Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), Order, 1973
I.C.J. 347 (Dec. 15).
221. See List of Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, supra note 114.

2016]

HURTING MORE THAN HELPING

117

respond to the Marshall Islands, in each prior instance India
strove to block the proceedings by arguing that the ICJ lacked
jurisdiction.222
India was among the first nations to file a declaration of
acceptance (and reservations) to the Optional Clause, accepting
compulsory jurisdiction in 1940.223 Portugal filed its declaration
on December 19, 1955, and its application against India on
December 22.224 The case concerned whether India violated
obligations to Portugal’s right of passage in Indian coastal
territory.225 Not to be out-filed, India updated its reservations on
January 7, 1956.226 India made six preliminary objections to
jurisdiction, including an unsuccessful argument that one of
Portugal’s reservations was inappropriately retroactive and
therefore out of line with Article 36 of the ICJ Charter.227 Three
further objections were based on India’s own declaration,
including arguments concerning reciprocity and exclusive
domestic jurisdiction.228 The ICJ voted overwhelmingly to reject
four of the objections, but joined two to the merits of the case,
including the matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction and the
date of commencement for ripeness purposes.229 The court found
that it had jurisdiction, but ultimately found that India had not
violated its obligations to Portugal.230
India’s single application to the ICJ was unusual. After a
dramatic falling out over airspace, Pakistan filed a complaint
before the Council of the International Civil Aviation

222. See Sushant Singh, Going to the Hague: India and the ICJ, the Big
Picture, INDIAN EXPRESS (June 4, 2015), http://indianexpress.com/article
/explained/going-to-the-hague-india-and-icj-the-big-picture/.
223. See New Declarations, supra note 66 (stating that “half a dozen other
states, among them France and India, followed the precedent set by the United
States [and appended to their declaration of acceptance various
uncontemplated reservations]”). See also Brunson MacChesney, Judicial
Decisions: Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v.
India), 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 327 (1958).
224. See MacChesney, supra note 223, at 327–28.
225. See id. at 327 (“Portugal filed an application submitting to the [c]ourt a
dispute between Portugal and India concerning the right of passage over Indian
territory between the territory of Daman and two enclaved territories as well
as between the two enclaved territories.”).
226. Id. at 330.
227. Id. at 329.
228. Id. at 331–37.
229. Id. at 337.
230. Brunson MacChesney, Judicial Decisions: Case Concerning Right of
Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 673, 690 (1960).
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Organization.231 In 1971, India appealed to the ICJ for a ruling
on whether the Council was competent to entertain Pakistan’s
complaint.232 In turn, Pakistan objected that the ICJ was not
competent to determine the Council’s competence.233 Ultimately,
the ICJ held that it was competent to determine the Council’s
competence, and that the Council was authorized to rule on
Pakistan’s complaint.234
Pakistan’s filing against India in 1973 alleged genocide
against Pakistani nationals and was voluntarily dismissed after
the two nations negotiated in New Delhi.235 Pakistan filed
against India again in 1999.236 In that case, the ICJ found that
it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits.237 Among other
reasons, the court relied on India’s September 1974 declaration
relating to the Optional Clause.238 India’s “Commonwealth
reservation,” barring jurisdiction in matters brought between
Commonwealth states, was successfully invoked.239
Looking forward, one commentator noted, “[g]iven the
Court’s approach to the Optional Clause and the extremely
broad reservations contained in India’s Optional Clause
declaration, it is unlikely that the Court will be able to entertain
any dispute involving that country, whether as applicant or as
respondent, based on the Optional Clause.”240 Indeed, for now,
India may bet that its strong reservations will block the
Marshall Islands’ case. While India largely hung its hat on the
Commonwealth reservation in 1999, the Marshall Islands is no
Commonwealth state. Further, in cases of major powers
subsequent to India’s last brush with the World Court, such
231. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.),
Judgment of 18 August 1972, U.N. Y.B. 1972, 203–06 http://legal.un.
org/UNJuridicalYearbook/pdfs/english/ByChapter/chpVII/1972/chpVII.pdf.
232. Alona E. Evans, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council
(India v. Pak.): Judgment of 18 August 1972, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 127, 127 (1973).
233. Id. at 129.
234. Id. at 145 (holding that India’s unilateral suspension of the pertinent
treaties did not render inoperative those treaties’ clauses granting jurisdiction
to the ICAO Council).
235. Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), Judgment, 1973
I.C.J. 347, 348 (Dec. 15).
236. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India),
Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 1 (June 21).
237. Id. ¶ 46.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Peter H.F. Bekker, Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), 94
AM. J. INT’L L. 707, 712–13 (2000).
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broad deference has not been shown to reservations in Optional
Clause declarations. In the past decade, Japan lost arguments
against ICJ jurisdiction.241
India’s reservations continued to ebb and flow over the late
twentieth century, more carefully worded as time passed. As one
commentator characterized India’s reservations, “[s]uch
exceptions effectively nullify any acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction.”242 Another predicted:
Nowhere has the quantity and density of reservations
reached the same level as in the case of India, which has
succeeded in shaping an instrument that will certainly
prevent any attempt ever to bring an application against
it, thus converting the act of acceptance into a barely
veiled act of non-acceptance.243
India did not withdraw its Optional Clause declaration the
last time the nation was forced to argue against jurisdiction on
grounds of its reservations. Why would India withdraw now?
Because the Court has since construed Optional Clause
reservations more narrowly, and at least one major power lost
the jurisdiction argument on grounds of its reservations within
the past decade.
If seeking to argue against jurisdiction, India could also
make the Monetary Gold argument as the United Kingdom may,
asserting that the ICJ cannot decide a matter of breached
obligations when some bound parties are not included.244
Further, without even taking the energy to eviscerate the
Marshall Islands’ erga omnes construction from the 1996
advisory opinion, India could analogize to the 2012 Belgium v.
Senegal case and characterize the obligation as erga omnes
partes, which seems to be a more comfortable stance for the
ICJ—arguing that the obligation is specific to the subset of
states party to the NPT.245 While India may have a strong case
241. See, e.g., Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan, N.Z. intervening),
Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 225, at ¶¶ 36–41 (Mar. 31), http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/148/18136.pdf (holding that Japan’s objection to the Court’s
jurisdiction cannot be upheld).
242. Giustini, supra note 138, at 239.
243. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 677.
244. See supra Section V(C).
245. See supra Section II(B)(2). Again, the ICJ has never found a breach of
a universal obligation erga omnes, and only in one instance found a breach of
an obligation erga omnes partes. See Uchkunova, supra note 84.
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against jurisdiction, and even a memory of winning the
argument before, losing the jurisdiction question may prompt
India to withdraw its declaration to the Optional Clause for
sheer desire to avoid entanglement in the merits arguments.
B. LOSING ON THE MERITS: INDIA’S HISTORY WITH THE NPT
Luckily for India, given the unsure footing of its potential
arguments for procedural bars, the Marshall Islands’ merits
claims are weak. The Marshall Islands’ case against India can
only be based on attenuated interpretations of custom and
obligations erga omnes. India’s history relative to the NPT is
rich.
India’s position toward nuclear weapons and the
international community, generally, can best be summarized by
the mid-twentieth century statement of Dr. Homi Bhabha,
Secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy under
Jawaharlal Nehru: “We must have the capability [for nuclear
weapons]. We should first prove ourselves and then talk of
Gandhi, non-violence and a world without nuclear weapons.”246
India has consistently employed strong rhetoric against
proliferation, all the while developing its own technology and
stating that non-proliferation should only be discussed when
every nuclear weapons state intended to do away with their
weapons.
India made strong efforts to influence the language of the
NPT in early deliberations. Negotiations on NPT’s Articles IV,
V, and VI were insufficient to convince India to sign, and India
was the only nation to reject the NPT on principle.247 According
to Indira Gandhi, “India’s refusal to sign the NPT was based on
enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national
security . . . nuclear weapon powers insist on their right to
continue to manufacture more weapons . . . . India does not
propose to manufacture nuclear weapons.”248
India’s subsequent nuclear explosion in 1974 was allegedly
a peaceful one, though twenty-three years later the bomb
designer stated, “there was nothing peaceful about it. I just want

246. Weiss, supra note 15, at 73.
247. Aaron Tovish, India and the NPT, in THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA 89, 89 (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012) (stating
China did not sign either).
248. Weiss, supra note 15, at 79.
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to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful.”249 By then,
India was stuck. In what Indian officials deemed “nuclear
apartheid,” the nation could join the NPT as a non-nuclear
weapons state—the only option available to a nation that tested
after January 1967, maiming the legitimacy of the nation’s
proud nuclear program—or remain a rogue, armed outsider.250
India chose the latter.
India’s rhetoric again countered its actions two decades
later. Anticipating the ICJ’s advisory opinion on nuclear
weapons, India submitted a brief to the ICJ in 1995, strongly
denouncing the legality of even the “production and manufacture
of nuclear weapons;” just three years later, India conducted five
nuclear tests.251 Not surprisingly, Pakistan responded with six
nuclear tests within two weeks.252 If anyone was in a nuclear
arms race, patently violating the spirit of NPT Article VI, India
and Pakistan were. But could a nuclear arms race by non-parties
to the NPT amount to a violation of international law?
Despite India’s patent refusal to sign the NPT, seemingly
anticipating a suit such as the Marshall Islands’ present action,
India carefully argued that its policies and procedures were in
line with the NPT. India likewise refused to sign the Rome
Statute in 1999, in protest that use of nuclear weapons was not
included as a punishable crime.253 India’s fresh nuclear weapons
tests weakened its discourse.254 When India chose not to attend
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, External Affairs Minister
Jaswant Singh told Parliament that their government
functioned “consistent[ly] with the key provisions of [the] NPT
that apply to nuclear weapon states,” notably Article VI.255
While the five nuclear weapon states acting under the blessing
of the NPT have each abstained from further testing, and none
are engaged in a “nuclear arms race,” India continues to build a
249. Id.
250. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17;
Richard Price, Nuclear Weapons Don’t Kill People, Rogues Do, 44 INT’L POL. 232,
239 (2007) (“nuclear apartheid”).
251. Weiss, supra note 15, at 82–83. See generally Status of Nuclear Weapons
in International Law: Request for Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice, 37 INDIA J. INT’L L. 244, 244–49 (1997) (describing India’s general
views on the legality of nuclear weapons).
252. Weiss, supra note 15, at 83.
253. MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL
CIVIL SOCIETY ACHIEVEMENT 102 (2006).
254. Id. at 103 (India defended itself by maintaining that possession and
testing of nuclear weapons is lawful but actual use is illegal).
255. Weiss, supra note 15, at 83–84.
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“credible minimum deterrent” amounting to an arms race with
Pakistan, and an arguable attempt to establish nuclear
weaponry on equal footing with China.256 Throughout this
period, the United States and other world powers
overwhelmingly accepted India’s nuclear weapons status, even
outside the blessing of the NPT.257 Any global appeals the
Marshall Islands would attempt to make against India coloring
outside the lines of the NPT would likely fall on deaf ears—at
least the ears of major powers.258
C. INDIA’S PREDICAMENT RESEMBLES THOSE OF FRANCE AND
THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THEIR OPTIONAL CLAUSE
REVOCATIONS
Long before the Marshall Islands filed suit against India at
the ICJ, India laid groundwork to defend itself. India’s
reservations to the Optional Clause were meticulously planned,
and the nation made clear that even as a non-party to the NPT,
India found itself in compliance with the NPT’s requirements for
nuclear weapons states—at least it did fourteen years ago.
When the day finally came to answer accusations of
violating international law with its nuclear weapons, India did
not refute the attenuated erga omnes argument. At first glance,
this strategy seems odd, as the Marshall Islands’ argument
seems easily overcome. However, India’s actions could be easily
explained by an intention to ultimately withdraw from the
Optional Clause and to keep the company of other world powers
in how it does so. India argued that this case falls within one of
India’s reservations to the Optional Clause, just as France
argued in the Nuclear Tests case and as the United States
against Nicaragua.259 In this case, India declined to attend an
initial meeting at the ICJ to flesh out procedural matters,260 just
as France declined its initial meeting before withdrawal.

256. Id. at 84.
257. See Kate Sullivan, How the World Warms to a Nuclear India, INSIDE
STORY (May 3, 2012), www.insidestory.org.au/how-the-world-warmed-to-anuclear-india.
258. Id.
259. See supra Section IV(B–C).
260. See Press Release 2014/22, supra note 33.
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D. INDIA MAY STAY FOR LEGITIMACY
Compulsory submission is seemingly dispensable these
days. Why would India cling to it? Perhaps for legitimacy.261
India has little footing as a non-party to the NPT and only
recently gained a permanent ICJ judge for the first time in more
than two decades.262 India is certainly not holding on to
European idealism of international law. Even in its history of
nuclear weapons development, India has proven to be a scrappy,
self-serving country willing to assert its own opinions and to
absorb the consequences of not joining the NPT when its
attempts to influence NPT negotiations failed. More likely, India
is self-conscious about legitimacy and social capital.263
India has long wished to join the ranks of the permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council. Were the matter simply
left to the current permanent members, India may gain a
permanent seat with little fanfare. British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown was on board in 2008, though seemingly without
the company of the United States, Russia, or China.264 Nicolas
Sarkozy strongly supported the vision in 2010.265 Barack Obama
vocalized support during his 2010 visit to India,266 and again
261. Scott & Carr, supra note 137, at 58 (“The less powerful states may still
see some political advantage in accepting compulsory jurisdiction, thereby
gaining a modicum of equality with other nations of the world, and the more
powerful states still see some political advantage in avoiding the acceptance of
genuine legal equality.”).
262. See Permanent Indian Judge at ICJ After 21 Years, INDIAN EXPRESS
(Apr. 28, 2012), http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/permanent-indianjudge-at-icj-after-21-years/942619/.
263. Kate Sullivan, POLICY REPORT: IS INDIA A RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR
POWER? 9 (2014) (“India has maintained a powerful moral position in objection
to the persistence of two tiers of states in the global nuclear order and it may be
wise to try and revive the former social capital among developing countries that
derives from this.”). See also Katherine M. Davis, The Gujarat Shift: The
Tipping Point in India’s Post-Cold War Discourse on Human Rights 4 (May 29,
2012) (unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, University of Oxford), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2577114 (after the Cold War, “Indian leaders learned that affirmation
of international human rights norms was a litmus test for the liberal,
democratic status it so desired and the moral authority it did not realize it had
lost”).
264. See Will Woodward, “An Idea Whose Time Has Come”: Brown Backs UN
Security Council Seat for India, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2008), http://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2008/jan/21/india.wto.
265. See Sarkozy Calls for Permanent Security Council Seat For India,
HINDU (Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sarkozy-callsfor-permanent-security-council-seat-for-india/article931213.ece.
266. See Jason Burke, Barack Obama Offers Backing to India’s Bid for UN
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when visiting in early 2015.267 China and Russia both appear to
have warmed to the idea.268 Still, the current permanent
members would not make the decision in a vacuum. An effort to
give India a permanent seat would require an amendment to the
U.N. Charter, requiring a vote of two-thirds of the General
Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all U.N. members,
including every permanent Security Council member.269 As
India gains pivotal progress toward a permanent seat, its
hesitance to rock the boat before another United Nations organ
would be understandable.
VII. CONCLUSION: BETTER LUCK LEAVING THE ICJ FOR
DOMESTIC COURTS (OR, WHAT THE MARSHALL
ISLANDS GOT RIGHT)
Given the French and American experiences withdrawing
from the Optional Clause, an imminent British or Indian
withdrawal is wholly imaginable. While either state may remain
in order to make a statement, there is no imaginable scenario in
which the Marshall Islands could win either case on the merits.
A finding of obligations erga omnes or customary international
law would be unfounded and unprecedented; India has never
been party to the NPT, and if nothing else, the Monetary Gold
precedent should terminate these proceedings.270 In any
probable outcome, the ICJ will likely lose an additional shred of
legitimacy.
As the world waits to learn how India and the United
Security Council Seat, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/08/obama-india-un-security-council.
267. Press Release, The White House, Statements by President Obama and
Prime Minister Modi of the Republic of India (Jan. 25, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/statements-presidentobama-and-prime-minister-modi-republic-india; Press Release, The White
House, Remarks by President Obama in Address to the People of India (Jan. 27,
2015),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/27/remarkspresident-obama-address-people-india.
268. Ananth Krishnan, India Gets Greater Backing from China and Russia
Over UN Security Council Seat, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 2, 2015), www.dailymail.
co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2937182/China-Russia-India-seat-securitycouncil.html.
269. U.N. Charter art. 108.
270. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30 (“In accordance with Article 38,
paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the Applications of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands have been transmitted to the six Governments concerned.
Unless and until consent is given to the Court’s jurisdiction, there is no case to
be entered in the General List.”).
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Kingdom will respond to the Marshall Islands, the ICJ’s
legitimacy hangs in the balance. If the number of states
submitting to the Optional Clause is truly any standard of the
ICJ’s legitimacy, and if either of these nations withdraws in the
face of these proceedings, the ICJ will be one step closer to
illegitimacy. The irony of this possible outcome, coupled with the
futility of the Marshall Islands’ arguments on the merits, begs
the question of what end game the Marshall Islands envisioned
at the start. Even if the cases never reach the merits, and the
ICJ is forced to articulate one or two more instances in which it
lacks jurisdiction to resolve interstate disputes, a sting of
illegitimacy will be felt. The ICJ was designed to thrive in this
arena.
The probable backfiring of these proceedings highlights the
need for a practical analysis of where the ICJ is headed, whether
its initial ideals are worth salvaging, and whether revitalization
is even feasible. As the ICJ cases falter, the world should look
back to the Marshall Islands’ American case for a new way
forward. Despite a seeming destiny for failure before the
International Court of Justice, the Marshall Islands may
reconvene an impactful and long forgotten method of
counteracting major powers’ exceptionalism in international
law—seeking relief in the powers’ own courts.271

See Katherine Maddox Davis, Promise Despite Overreach in Marshall Islands
v. United States, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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